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iv.

IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS

JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),

)

Plaintiff, Appellee,
and Cross-Appellant,

) Case No, 920733-CA
)
) District Court No. 880904192
)
) Priority No. 15
)

vs .
THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant, Appellant,
and Cross-Appellee.

)
)

BRIEF OF APPELLEE
AND CROSS-APPELLANT
JOANN NUNLEY

JURISDICTION
The Utah Court of Appeals is authorized by Utah Code Ann. § 7 8 2a-3(2)(i) (1992) and Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure 3 and 4 to
hear this appeal

(domestic relations case) from the Third Judicial

District Court.

NATURE OF PROCEEDINGS
This is an appeal from an Order Modifying a Decree of Divorce,
entered October 2, 1992.
Notice

of Appeal

Plaintiff

(Record at 1068-1075).

on November

2,

1992

(Record

Defendant filed his
at

1099-1100),

filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November

(Record at 1106-07).

and

13, 1992.

STATEMENT OF ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
The following issues are raised on appeal and on cross-appeal:
1.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by modifying

the Decree of Divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of the
minor child's private school expenses, and to enter judgment against
him for one-half of such expenses previously incuirred.

The trial

court's

abuse

modification

discretion.

determination

is

reviewed

for

of

Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah

Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992).
2.

Whether the trial court erred or abused its discretion in

refusing to allow Defendant credit toward his obligation to pay onehalf of Michelle's private school expenses for amounts she receives
from Social Security as a result of his disability. Under 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a), the trial court's ruling is reviewed for correction of
error.

Philpott v. Essex County

Welfare Bd., 409 U.S. 413, 93 S.

Ct. 590 (1973); Mask v. Maskf 620 P.2d 883 (N.M. 1980).

In contrast,

if Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(8)(a) is applicable, the court's ruling
is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-45-

7.5(8)(a).
3.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in allowing

Plaintiff to submit evidence after the conclusion of trial to
establish amounts claimed and sought at trial.

The trial court's

determination is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

Utah R. Civ. P.

43(b); Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc. v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143
(Utah 1977) .
4.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in refusing

to modify the Divorce Decree to require Defendant to pay an increased
2

amount of child support.

The trial court's decision to modify a

divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an abuse of discretion.
Hagan v. Haaan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App. 1991) (citing Jense v.
Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989)).
5.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion by refusing

to impute additional income to Defendant based upon his past-earnings
history and lifestyle.

The trial court's determination is reviewed

for abuse of discretion.

Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 480

(Utah App. 1991) (quoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah
App. 1987)).
6.

Whether the trial court erred by refusing to adjust

Defendant's tax-free income to reflect —

for purposes of child

support calculation — a gross income equivalent to a taxable income.
The trial court's refusal to adjust Defendant's income is reviewed
for correction of error.

See Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. Jones,

743 P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987).
7.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in admitting

Defendant's medical testimony without any expert testimony or medical
foundation.

The

trial

court's

decision

to

testimony is reviewed for abuse of discretion.

admit

Defendant's

GAW v. State ex re

Dep't of Trans., 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990).
8.

Whether the trial court abused its discretion in entering

judgment against Plaintiff for one-half the costs of transportation
for Defendant's visitation with the minor child from and after the
date of filing of the amended petition to modify the Decree of
Divorce.

The trial court's modification determination is reviewed

3

for abuse of discretion. Muir v. Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App.
1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992).

DETERMINATIVE STATUTORY AUTHORITY
Title 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides:
The right of any person to any future payment
under this subchapter shall not be transferable
or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing
under this subchapter shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
Utah Code Ann. § 30-3-5(3). Disposition of property - Maintenance
and health care of parties and children - Division of debts - Court
to have continuing jurisdiction - Custody and visitation Termination of alimony - Nonmeritorious petition for modification.
(3) The court has continuing jurisdiction to
make subsequent changes or new orders for the
support and maintenance of the parties, the
custody of the children and their support,
maintenance, health, and dental care, or the
distribution of the property and obligations for
debts as is reasonable and necessary.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.
Rebuttable guidelines.

Determination of amount of support -

(1) Prospective support shall be equal to the
amount granted by prior court order unless there
has been a material change or circumstance on
the part of the obligor or obligee.
(2) If the court finds sufficient evidence to
rebut the guidelines, the court shall establish
support after considering all relevant factors,
including but not limited to:
(a) the
parties;
(b) the
(c) the
(d) the
(e) the
(f) the

standard of living and situation of the
relative wealth and income of the parties;
ability of the obligor to earn;
ability of the obligee to earn;
needs of the obligee, the obligor, and the child;
ages of the parties; and

4

(g) the responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee
for the support of others.
Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income - Imputed
income^

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case.

The parties were divorced in the State of

California in August 1985. Plaintiff petitioned for modification of
the foreign Divorce Decree on June 27, 1988, and then filed an
Amended Petition on November 25, 1988. The Amended Petition alleged,
among other things, that:

(1) the Decree required Defendant, based

upon his monthly net income of $1,600.00, to pay $300.00 child
support per month; (2) the Decree was silent with respect to payment
of the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses; (3) the
expenses associated with raising the minor child had increased since
the Decree due to the effects of inflation and cost of living
increases as well as the increased age and needs of the minor child;
(4) Plaintiff can no longer afford to carry the entire burden of
paying for the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses.
Plaintiff requested that the court order Defendant to pay for
one-half of the minor child's private-school tuition and expenses.
In addition, Plaintiff requested that the court order Defendant to
pay increased child support commensurate with the applicable child
support guidelines as well as visitation transportation expenses and
extracurricular expenses incurred on behalf of the minor child.
Disposition in the Lower Court. After trial on April 22, 1991,
the trial court, in its April 26, 1991 Minute Entry, found, based on
the substantial change of circumstances that had occurred, that it
5

was reasonable for both parties to share equally in the cost of
transportation for the minor child's visitation with Defendant, and
that Plaintiff reimburse Defendant for one-half of the transportation
costs reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights with
the minor child.

The court found that there had not been a

substantial change of circumstances to justify an increase in child
support.

In addition, the court found, based on the parties' desire

of to maintain the minor child in private school, that each party
should

pay

one-half

of

the

tuition,

books,

supplies,

activities, and school uniforms, including arrearages.

school

The court

allowed Defendant to offset his obligation to pay one-half of the
private school expenses with the minor child's Social Security
benefits received as a result of Defendant's disability.
Plaintiff then filed a motion for clarification of divorce
modification issues, to which Defendant objected. After a hearing on
the motion, the trial court allowed Plaintiff to file a motion to
amend, together with any supporting memoranda.

The court allowed

Defendant thirty days to respond. After submissions by the parties,
the court, reversed it ruling allowing Defendant a credit for his
obligation to pay one-half of the visitation transportation expenses
against the minor child's Social Security benefits. Defendant filed
Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1992.

Plaintiff filed Notice of

Cross-Appeal on November 13, 1992.

STATEMENT OF FACTS
Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced in Los Angeles, California
in August 1985. The California Decree of Divorce awarded the parties
6

joint legal and physical custody of the parties' minor child,
Michelle, born September 18, 1980, with Plaintiff having primary
physical custody.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14 and Trial Transcript p.

4).
1.

The original Decree ordered Defendant, based upon his net

monthly income of $1600.00, to pay $300.00 per month child support.
(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14).
2.

The original Decree ordered Plaintiff to provide expenses

for the transportation of the minor child to and from Los Angeles for
visitation with Defendant.
3.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 14).

Plaintiff petitioned the court for Modification of the

foreign Decree on or about June 27, 1988.

(Record at 2-10).

In her

petition, Plaintiff requested, based on a substantial change in
circumstances, that she no longer be obligated to pay visitation
transportation costs for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Los
Angeles.

(Record

at 2-10).

Plaintiff

substantial change in circumstances:

alleged the

following

(1) Defendant had moved from

Los Angeles to Montana, since the Decree (2) there were no TWA
flights1 between Salt Lake City and Montana, (3) and Defendant no
longer resided in the "family home."
4.

(Record at 2-10).

On or about August 11, 1988, Defendant filed an Answer to

Plaintiff's Petition and filed a Counter Motion.
5.

(Record at 15-20).

On or about November 23, 1988, pursuant to stipulation,

Plaintiff filed her First Amended Petition for Modification of
Foreign Divorce Decree.

(Record at 44).

1

In addition to Plaintiff's

Plaintiff was an employee of TWA and received free and/or
discounted air travel.
7

request

regarding

the

transportation

issue, Plaintiff

sought

a

modification requiring Defendant to pay one-half of the minor child's
medical and dental expenses, including insurance premiums, one-half
of the minor child's private school tuition, costs, and expenses, as
well as an increase in child support.

(Record at 34-43).

6.

The matter came on for trial on April 22, 1991.

(Record at

7.

At the time the parties were divorced in 1985, Defendant

218) .

had retired from the Los Angeles Police Department, (Record at 1196),
with a net income of $1600.00 per month.

(Record at 1055).

At the

same time, Plaintiff was employed by TWA with a gross income of
$28,687.24. (Record at 1164).
8.
pension

At

trial, Defendant

income of

testified

that

he

had

disability

$2322.26 per month from his Los Angeles

City

Pension Plan and $697.00 per month in Social Security disability
benefits.
9.

(See Defendant's Exhibit 6 ) .
Plaintiff testified that her employment with TWA terminated

in June 1989.

(Record at 1126-34).

At the time of trial, Plaintiff

was self-employed in the business of, designing, manufacturing, and
distributing costumes in the business name of Nunley, Inc.
at 1128).

(Record

From 1989-91, Plaintiff did not take a salary from the

company, with the exception of $2000.00 in 1989 used to pay for the
minor child's tuition at Rowland Hall St. Mark's private school. All
other monies received by Plaintiff were reimbursements for expenses
incurred on behalf of the corporation.

(Record at 1129).

At trial,

Plaintiff stipulated that her income was $800.00 per month.
at 1130) .
8

(Record

10.

Plaintiff

presented

evidence

that

Defendant

owned

a

$53,000.00 Ferrari sports car (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 8), a ranch in
Montana (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 9), and deposits of $173,650.58
deposited into Defendant's checking account from May 16, 1988 through
July 17, 1990.
11.
history

Plaintiff also presented evidence of Defendant's earning
(See

Plaintiff's

Exhibit

3)

and

extensive

activities since obtaining his disability in 1984.

employment

(See Plaintiff's

Exhibit 14) .
12.

It was established that Plaintiff was receiving Social

Security benefits for and on behalf of the minor child, Michelle.
(Record at 1168). Plaintiff testified that the amounts received were
being put into a savings account for the minor child because of a
concern, based upon an interview with a person from Social Security,
that if it were shown that Defendant was fraudulently receiving
benefits, all the monies would have to be repaid to the Social
Security Administration.
13.

(Record at 1172-74).

During their marriage, the parties sent the minor child to

Westchester Lutheran School private school in California. (Record at
1135).

After moving to Salt Lake City following the divorce,

Plaintiff enrolled the minor child at Rowland Hall-St. Mark's private
school.
14.

Plaintiff believed, based upon numerous facts shown at

trial, that it was Defendant's desired to have the minor child attend
a private school.

(Record at 1135-39).

Further, in prior court

proceedings, approximately one year following the divorce, Defendant
expressed a desire that the minor child remain in private school, and
9

he indicated deep concerns that Plaintiff might be taking the minor
child out of private school and placing her in public school.
Plaintiff's Exhibit 6 and Record at 1235-39).

(See

At trial, Defendant

admitted that '• [he] had always wanted Michelle to remain in private
school, if possible."
15.

(Record at 1237).

Following trial, on or about April 26, 1991, the court

entered its Minute Entry (Record at 221-27) and ruled as follows:
a.

After expressing concern that neither of the parties
had accurately revealed his or her income, the court,
based on the evidence, found that Plaintiff's current
monthly income was $800.00, and that Defendant's
current monthly income was $3029.26. The court denied
Plaintiff's

reguest

for

increased

child support,

finding that there had not been substantial change of
circumstances to justify an increase, and that the
$300.00 provided the original Decree was in excess of
the guidelines, and that Defendant had agreed that he
would not pay less than $300.00 per month child
support.
b.

The

court,

with

respect

to

the

visitation

transportation expenses, found a sufficient change of
circumstances to modify the Decree, based in part on
Plaintiff's change of employment2, and that Defendant
had

moved

from

Los

2

Angeles

to

Montana,

which

Due to Plaintiff's termination of her employment with TWA she
could no longer provide free and/or reduced rate airfare for the
minor child.
10

technically terminated Plaintiff's obligation under
the Decree. The court ordered that the parties share
equally in the cost of visitation transportation for
the minor child, and ordered Plaintiff to reimburse
Defendant for one-half the visitation transportation
reasonably incurred.
c.

After finding that it was the desire of Plaintiff and
Defendant to maintain the minor child in private
school.

Therefore, the court ordered each party to

pay one-half of the private school tuition, books,
supplies, school activities, and school uniforms for
the minor child.

This obligation does not extend to

the minor child's extracurricular activities.

The

court ruled that the amount being paid by Social
Security to Plaintiff on behalf of the minor child
should be applied against Defendant's obligation to
pay one-half the private school expenses.

The court

ordered that judgment be entered against Defendant for
the

past

private

school

expenses

incurred

by

Plaintiff.
d.
16.

Each party was ordered to pay their own attorney fees.

On or about June 6, 1991, Plaintiff filed a Motion for

Clarification of Ruling and In-Camera Interview. Plaintiff's Motion
stated that the Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law proposed by
Defendant's counsel did not conform with the court's Minute Entry.
The motion further stated there were certain issues that needed to be
clarified, and that due to the fact that the parties were unable to
11

communicate with respect to the minor child's summer visitation, the
court should conduct an in-camera interview with the child,

(Record

at 292-94).
17.

Defendant

filed

an Answer

to

Plaintiff's

Motion

for

Clarification and In Camera Interview on or about June 10, 1991.
Defendant included a Countermotion for attorney fees.

(Record at

302-05).
18.

Plaintiff filed a Response to Defendant's Countermotion for

Attorney's Fees on or about June 17, 1991, arguing that Defendant
should not be awarded attorney fees because Plaintiff's Motion was a
simple request and did not require Defendant to file a lengthy
response.
19.

(Record at 306-08).
Plaintiff's Motion for Clarification came on for hearing

August 7, 1991.
20.

(See Transcript of hearing at Record pp. 419-82).

The trial court ordered Plaintiff to submit a motion or

brief, pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Jud. Admin., on the
following issues:
a.

Whether or not it was appropriate for the court to
apply the minor child's Social Security benefits to
Defendant's obligation to pay one-half the private
school expenses.

b.

(Record at 459-60).

The amounts paid by Plaintiff for tuition, books,
supplies, activities, and uniforms for private school
for the minor child to be reimbursed by Defendant.
(Record at 469-71).

c.

The court found it had failed to address Plaintiff's
claim for one-half of medical and dental expenses
12

incurred on behalf of the minor child.

The trial

court directed Plaintiff to submit the amounts paid
for medical and dental expenses for the minor child to
determine the amount to be reimbursed by Defendant.
(Record at 474-76).
21.

Plaintiff's counsel was to file the motion / brief and

Defendant's counsel was given thirty (30) days to respond.

(Record

at 357).
22.

On or about September 16, 1991, Defendant filed a Motion to

Strike Plaintiff's Reserved Issues from Motion for Clarification,
Sanctions, and Attorney Fees, stating that Plaintiff had failed to
timely file her motion.

(Record at 376-379). The trial court denied

the motion on or about November 8, 1991.
23.

Consistent with the trial court's August 7, 1991 ruling,

Plaintiff filed her Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Divorce
Modification Issues on or about November 1, 1991.
731).

(Record at 527-

In support of her position that the court should not use the

minor child's Social Security benefits to meet the obligations of her
father, Plaintiff

submitted

a letter from the

Administration and cited statutory and case law.

Social

Security

Plaintiff also

submitted, in affidavit form, the amounts expended on behalf of the
minor child for private school and medical and dental expenses.
24.
Memorandum

On

or

about

December

in Opposition

6,

1991, Defendant

to Plaintiff's

Motion

Determination of Divorce Modification Issues.

for

filed

his

Post-Trial

(Record 747-53).

Defendant filed a supplement to his primary Memorandum in opposition
on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777) and then filed an "Answer" to
13

Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Determination and in Support of his
Motion for Attorney Fees on December 17, 1991 (Record at 780).
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Plaintiff filed Motions to Strike Defendant's Supplement

and "Answer" (Record at 759 and 788). The court granted Plaintiff's
Motions.

(Record at 798).

26.

In its December 19, 1991 Minute Entry, the court granted

Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial Determination of Modification
Issues pursuant to Rule 4-501, Utah Code of Jud. Admin.
796).

(Record at

The court vacated the April 26, 1991, ruling granting

Defendant a credit for amounts paid to the minor child by Social
Security.

The court also granted judgments against Defendant in the

amount of $13,360.75 for one-half the private school costs and
expenses and $805.23 for one-half the medical and dental expenses of
the minor child.
27.

Defendant filed a Motion for Ruling on Omitted Issues,

Motion for Evidentiary Hearing and Argument of Court's Minute Entry,
Motion for New Trial and Other Related Matters on or about December
31, 1991.
28.

(Record at 800-12).
On or about January 9, 1992, Plaintiff filed an Opposition

to Defendant's Motion for Ruling on Omitted Issues, Motion for
Evidentiary Hearing and Argument on Court's Minute Entry, Motion for
a New Trial and Other Related Matters.
29.

(Record at 813-23).

On or about January 10, 1992, Defendant filed a Motion to

Amend Judgment, and in the Alternative, for Relief from Judgment or
Order.

(Record at 824-27). Defendant also filed an objection to the

Plaintiff's proposed Order on Plaintiff's Motion for Post-Trial
Determination (Record at 828) and a motion for oral argument (Record
14

at 832), Plaintiff filed objections to Defendant's motions. (Record
at 839-49).

The court denied Defendant's motions in it Minute Entry

dated January 21, 1992.
30.

(Record at 850-52).

Each party prepared proposed Findings of Fact, Conclusions

of Law, and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce, and each party
objected to the other's proposed documents.
about

March

objections.

9,

1992, the

court

heard

(Record at 878).
oral

arguments

On or

on

the

(A copy of the transcript is found in the same bound

volume as the Trial Transcript.)

The parties agreed to discuss an

accounting of amounts due under the court's ruling and then submit
those amounts to the court for ruling.

(March 9, 1992, hearing

transcript pp. 46-47 and Record at 911).
31.

Defendant filed an accounting which included amounts that

the parties had agreed were due under the court's ruling as well as
his

objections

Plaintiff.

to

other

amounts which

(Record at 918-88).

had

been

submitted

by

Plaintiff filed a response and

objection to Defendant's accounting, setting forth the amounts agreed
to and then argument in support of the other amounts that should be
included in the order.
32.

(Record at 989-1028).

In its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, the court found

that Defendant owed Plaintiff $8,312.75 for one-half the private
school tuition and costs; $578.62 for one-half the medical and dental
expenses of the minor child; and $2,900.69 for uniforms, school
activities, and school supplies.
33.

(Record at 1040).

The court entered its Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law

and Order Modifying Decree of Divorce on October 2, 1992. (A copy of
each is attached hereto as Exhibit A ) .
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34.

Defendant filed his Notice of Appeal on November 2, 1992.

(Record at 1099) .
35.
1992.

Plaintiff filed her Notice of Cross-Appeal on November 13,

(Record at 1106).

SUMMARY OF ARGUMENT
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by modifying the
Decree of Divorce to require Defendant to pay one-half of the minor
child's private school expenses, and to enter judgment against him
for one-half of such expenses previously incurred.
The trial court neither erred nor did it abuse it discretion in
refusing to allow Defendant credit toward his obligation to pay onehalf of Michelle's private school expenses for amounts she receives
from Social Security as a result of his disability.
The trial court did not abuse its discretion by allowing
Plaintiff to submit evidence after the conclusion of trial to
establish amounts claimed.
The trial court abused its discretion in refusing to modify the
Divorce Decree to require Defendant to pay an increased amount of
child support.
The trial court abused its discretion by refusing to impute
additional income to Defendant based upon his past-earnings history
and lifestyle.
The trial court erred by refusing to adjust Defendant's tax-free
income to reflect —

for purposes of calculation of child support

pursuant to the applicable child support guidelines — a gross income
equivalent to a taxable income.
16

The trial court abused its discretion by admitting Defendant's
medical testimony in evidence without any expert testimony or medical
foundation.
The trial court erred in entering judgment against Plaintiff for
one-half the costs of transportation for Defendant's visitation with
the minor child from and after the date of filing of the amended
petition to modify the decree of divorce.

ARGUMENT
1.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
MODIFYING THE DECREE OF DIVORCE TO REQUIRE
DEFENDANT TO PAY ONE-HALF OF THE MINOR CHILD'S
PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES, AND TO ENTER JUDGMENT
AGAINST HIM FOR ONE-HALF OF SUCH EXPENSES
PREVIOUSLY INCURRED.

The original California Decree of Divorce, entered on or about
August 14, 1985, awarded the parties joint legal custody of the
parties' minor

child, Michelle, and

awarded

Plaintiff

primary

physical custody of Michelle. (Record at 1118 and Plaintiff's Exhibit
6).

By petition, June 27, 1988 (Record at 2), and by Amended

Petition, November 23, 1988 (Record at 34), Plaintiff petitioned the
court for modification of the Decree of Divorce, requesting, inter
alia, that Defendant be required to pay one-half of the minor child's
private school tuition and costs.

(Record at 42).

After thoroughly

considering the issues, the court ordered Defendant to pay one-half
of the minor child's private school expenses.

(Record at 225).

To obtain modification of a divorce decree, a party must show
that there has been a substantial change in circumstances subsequent
to the decree that was not contemplated in the original decree.
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Woodward v. Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam);
Muir v, Muir, 841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann.
§ 78-45-7 (1992).
court's

Once such a showing has been made, the trial

modification

discretion.

determination

is

reviewed

for

abuse

of

Muir, 841 P.2d at 739.3

On appeal, Defendant contends that the trial court abused its
discretion in modifying the Decree of Divorce to require him to pay
one-half of the minor child's private school expenses.

Defendant

claims that the trial court did not specifically find that there had
been

a

change

of

circumstances

sufficient

to

warrant

the

modification.
"In cases tried to the bench, the court is required to 'find the
facts specially' and thus ground its decision on findings of fact
which resolve the material factual uncertainties and are expressed in
enough detail to enable a reviewing court to determine whether they
are clearly erroneous."

Erwin v. Erwinf 773 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah

App. 1989) (quoting Utah R. Civ. P. 52(a).

A review of the findings

is not limited to written findings, rather, the appellate court may
view the "findings from various sources in the record."

id.

In

order "to ensure the court acted within its discretion, the facts and
reasons

for the

court's decision must be

set

forth

fully in

appropriate findings and conclusions." Painter v. Painter, 752 P.2d
907, 909 (Utah App. 1988) (citations omitted); accord Linam v. King,
804 P.2d 1235, 1237 (Utah App. 1991). Moreover, the findings must be

3

Because Defendant has failed to cite the standard of review
as required by the Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure, this Court
should "assume the correctness of the trial court's judgment."
Christensen v. Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991).
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adequate

to

ensure

"'that

the

trial

determination was rationally based.'"

court's

discretionary

Painter, 752 P.2d at 909

(quoting Martinez v. Martinez, 728 P.2d 994, 994 (Utah 1986)).
Once the findings are deemed sufficiently detailed for appellate
review, the appellate court gives "great deference to the trial
court's findings of fact" and "will not overturn them unless they are
clearly erroneous."
1989).

Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App.

Because of such deference given "to the trial court to judge

the credibility of witnesses," this standard applies even when the
findings are based on hotly disputed evidence.
52(a).

Id.; Utah R. Civ. P.

"The trial court is best suited to assess the factors upon

which it based its determination, given its proximity to the parties
and circumstances, and its opportunity to personally observe and
evaluate the witnesses."

Myers v. Myers, 768 P. 2d 979, 984 (Utah

App. 1989) (citing Alexander v. Alexander, 737 P.2d 221, 223 (Utah
1987) ) .
Although there is not a specific finding that there had been a
substantial change in circumstances as to the private school expenses
issue, the trial court's findings are sufficiently detailed to allow
for appellate review.

Furthermore, the findings and the record,

taken as a whole, provide ample evidence for the trial court's
determinations on the private school expenses issue.
For example, in finding number four of the Findings of Fact and
Conclusions of Law, the trial court found that at the time of entry
of the divorce decree in 1985, Plaintiff was employed with TWA
Airlines with a gross monthly income of $2390.60, and that Defendant
was receiving a disability net income of $1600.00 per month. (Record
19

at 1055).

At the time of filing of her petition for modification,

Plaintiff, who became self-employed in 1989, experienced over a
sixty-five

percent

reduction

in

income.

Based

on

stipulated

testimony at trial, the court found that Plaintiff's income was
approximately $833.00 per month. (Record at 1055).

In contrast, the

court found that, since the Decree, Defendant's tax free disability
and Social Security income had increased over forty-five percent to
$3029.26 gross per month.4

(Record at 1055).

This substantial

change of both parties' income, alone, warrants a conclusion that
Defendant should, at the very least, be required to pay one-half of
the minor child's private school expenses.
In addition to the court's findings regarding the substantial
change in income of the parties, the court found that Defendant
claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain his Ferrari sports
car, and that Defendant, during a twenty-five month period, from May
16, 1998 through July 17, 1990, deposited approximately $173,000.00
into his checking account, which amounts to approximately $100,000.00
of unexplained income that Defendant receives in excess of the taxfree disability income of $3029.26 per month.

(Record at 222-23,

1056).

the

Moreover,

in

making

its

findings,

court

noted,

explicitly, that Defendant received additional income that the court
was unable to specifically identify.

(Record 222-23, 1056).

Another substantial change in circumstances has occurred since
the original Decree, namely, the enrollment of the minor child in

4

Because Defendant's income is tax free, it is equivalent to
a net income for purposes of comparison to his previously received
income.
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Rowland-Hall St. Mark's private school, which has reguired Plaintiff
to expend substantial amounts of money.

(Record at 1059).

Prior to

the divorce becoming final in 1985, the parties had been sending the
minor child, Michelle, to Westchester Lutheran School, a private
preschool located in California.
lines 17-19).

(Record at 1135, lines 6-7; 1139,

The cost of the Westchester private preschool, which

was approximately $300.00 per month, was substantially less than the
post-Decree expenditures reguired to maintain the minor child in
Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, which were approximately twice as much as
Westchester.

(Record at 548-657).

Because the Decree of Divorce was premised on a stipulated
agreement that has never been the subject of an objective appraisal
on the merits (See Plaintiff's Exhibit 6), the changed-circumstances
rule should be relaxed in the instant case. See Elmer v. Elmerr 77 6
P.2d 599 (Utah 1989).

Although Elmer was a modification of custody

case, the spirit of the rule is applicable in cases such as this
where an issue is being adjudicated for the first time.

However,

even if the Court determines that the changed-circumstances rule
should

not be relaxed

substantial

in this

case, the previously

changes in circumstances

discussed

support the trial court's

determination concerning the private school.
In his opening brief at pages 23-25, Defendant argues that the
court's finding regarding his financial ability to pay "is contrary
to the evidence and an abuse of discretion."

Defendant, however,

misperceives the standard for reviewing findings of fact and the
underlying reasons why deference is given to the trial court's
findings.

Findings of fact are not reviewed for an abuse of
21

discretion, rather, they are overturned only if they are clearly
erroneous.

Notwithstanding Defendant's argument, a review of the

record, together with the findings of fact and conclusions of law,
reveal that the trial court thoroughly reviewed all the evidence
concerning Defendant's ability to pay. (Record 1063, Finding of Fact
30).

In fact, Hardisty v. Hardisty, 439 A.2d 307 (Conn. 1981), which

Defendant cites in support of his inability-to-pay argument, supports
the trial court's determination in the instant case. Like the court
in Hardisty, the trial court, after considering the totality of the
circumstances, including Defendant's ability to pay, concluded that
Defendant should be required to pay one-half of his daughter's
private school expenses.

See id. at 312;5 see also Utah Code Ann.

§7 8-45-7(3) (outlining the relevant factors to be considered in
establishing the support of others).
Furthermore,
Defendant

fails

in
to

challenging
"marshal

the

the

trial

evidence

court's
which

findings,

supports

the

finding[s] and then demonstrate that, despite this evidence, [it is]
clearly erroneous." Christensen v. Munns, 812 P. 2d 69, 73 (Utah App.
1991);

accord Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d

465

(Utah App. 1989).

Instead, Defendant merely refers the Court to evidence that conflicts
with the findings and supports his contention that he should not have
to pay the private school tuition and expenses.

5

Even if the Court

Although Hardisty supports the court's determination in the
instant case, it is distinguishable from the instant case inasmuch
as the noncustodial parent, who was being asked to contribute
towards the private schooling of the parties' minor child, doubted
the value of the private school's program and believed that the
minor child's enrollment was unnecessary. Hardisty v. Hardistyf
439 A.2d 307, 314 (Conn. 1981).
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finds that Defendant sufficiently marshaled the evidence, the trial
court's findings on the private school expenses issue are not clearly
erroneous or against the clear weight of the evidence.
In his brief, Defendant characterizes Plaintiff's decision to
enroll the minor child in a private school as unilateral in nature.
He argues that such a decision is contrary to the award of joint
custody in the divorce decree.

The record, however, reveals that

prior to divorce, Plaintiff and Defendant agreed that the minor child
should attend private school.

(Record at 1138-39).

This intent to

have Michelle attend private school is evidenced by her enrollment,
prior to the divorce, in Westchester Lutheran private preschool.
(Record at 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19). Additionally, in his
answer to Plaintiff's amended petition, Defendant admitted his desire
that the minor child remain enrolled in a private school. (Record at
55, parag. 11; see also Plaintiff's Exhibit 6, Declaration of Thomas
M. Brooks, parag. 7, lines 11-19).

In fact, in an order to show

cause proceeding, initiated in California by Defendant prior to this
Utah

proceeding,

Defendant,

in

the

course

of

expressing

his

displeasure with plaintiff's caretaking abilities, alleged that
Plaintiff had withdrawn Michelle from the private school she had been
attending.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 6). Based on this evidence, the

trial court specifically found that both the parties clearly desire
that Michelle attend private school.

(Record at 1059, Finding of

Fact 18).
Finally, Defendant fails to show how the trial court abused its
discretion in requiring him to pay one-half of the private school
expenses incurred prior to trial. The trial court, by virtue of its
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broad equitable powers in domestic relations cases, see Harmon v.
Harmon, 26 Utah 2d 436, 491 P.2d 231, 233 (1971); Thronson v.
Thronson, 810 P.2d 428, 431 (Utah App. 1991), fashioned the award in
a manner which it believed most equitable to the minor child and
parties.

The factors considered by the trial court were:

(1) that

Plaintiff had been paying the private school expenses since the
divorce in 1985; (2) that the expenses for private school cost
Plaintiff

approximately

$50,000.00; (3) that Defendant has the

ability to pay at least one-half of Michelle's private school
expenses; and (4) that both Plaintiff and Defendant desired that
Michelle attend private school.
Based on the foregoing, the trial court's findings support the
determination that there were substantial changes in circumstances.
Therefore, the trial court did not abuse its discretion in requiring
Defendant to pay one-half of the minor child's private school
expenses.

2.

THE TRIAL COURT NEITHER ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW
NOR DID IT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN REFUSING TO
ALLOW DEFENDANT TO OFFSET HIS OBLIGATION TO PAY
ONE-HALF OF MICHELLEfS PRIVATE SCHOOL EXPENSES
WITH HIS MINOR CHILD'S SOCIAL SECURITY BENEFITS.

The trial court, in its April 26, 1991 minute entry, attempted
to assign or transfer the minor child's Social Security benefits,
received due to Defendant's disability, to satisfy Defendant's
obligation for payment of private schooling expenses.
225).

(Record at

By way of motion for clarification filed June 6, 1991,

Plaintiff reguested that the trial court amend its judgment so as not
to

credit

the

minor

child's

Social
24

Security

benefits

toward

Defendant's

obligation.

(Record

456-59).

At the hearing on

Plaintiff's motion, and after considering a letter submitted by
Plaintiff from a Social Security Administration Official, the court
directed Plaintiff to file a memorandum, either by way of Rule 4-501,
Utah Code of Jud. Admin, or motion to amend, in support of her
position on the Social Security benefits issue.
The court provided
(Record 459-60).

(Record at 459).

Defendant an opportunity to fully respond.

After considering both parties' submissions, the

trial court vacated its ruling allowing the minor child's disability
benefits to be credited towards Defendant's obligation to pay onehalf of the minor child's private school expenses.

(Record at 796).

On appeal, Defendant argues that the trial court erred as a
matter of law in refusing to use his daughter's Social Security
benefits to offset his obligations to his daughter. Defendant claims
that the trial court erred in concluding that it did not have the
authority to allow such a credit in favor of Defendant. Defendant's
position is flawed.
Title 42 U.S.C. § 407(a) provides:
The right of any person to any future payment
under this subchapter shall not be transferable
or assignable, at law or in equity, and none of
the moneys paid or payable or rights existing
under this subchapter shall be subject to
execution, levy, attachment, garnishment, or
other legal process, or to the operation of any
bankruptcy or insolvency law.
(Emphasis added.)

After considering this portion of the code, the

United States Supreme Court, in Philpott v. Essex County Welfare Bd..
409 U.S. 413, 93 S. Ct. 590 (1973), held that the language of 42
U.S.C. § 407 is "all-inclusive."

Id. at 415; 93 S. Ct. at 592. The
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Court then ruled that § 407 "imposes a broad bar against the use of
any legal process to reach all Social Security benefits."

Id. at

417; 93 S. Ct. at 592 (emphasis added).
In Hennagin v. County of Yolof 481 F. Supp. 923 (E.D. Cal.
1979), the United States District Court for the Eastern District of
California ruled that the father's support obligations could not be
satisfied by reaching such benefits, and that state officials could
not obtain such funds for reimbursement of AFDC benefits paid by the
State to the children.

In so ruling, the court stated:

The Court adopts the position of the Social
Security Administration, . . . that in instances
where a parent is responsible for making courtordered support payments, such legal obligation
cannot be discharged by denominating children's
disability insurance benefits as "child support"
from the parent. To reguire that the children's
disability benefits here be credited toward
their father's child support arrearages would
indeed be ". . . ordering the children to pay
the accrued arrearages for their own support."
Id. at 924 (citations omitted).

Further, in Mask v. Mask, 620 P.2d

883 (N.M. 1980), the New Mexico Supreme Court stated:
Federal regulations prohibit the custodial
parent from recovering support arrearages out of
social security payments.
This should apply
egually to the non-custodial parent who seeks to
satisfy his support obligation by way of social
security payments made directly from the social
security administration to the child.
These
funds are the child's, and cannot be used to
meet [the father's] obligations, as stated in
Fuller v. Fuller, 306 N.E.2d 357, 358 (1976):
The Social Security Act, Title 42,
U.S. Code, Section 401 et seg.,
provides that every dependent child of
an individual who is entitled to
Social Security benefits shall be
entitled to a child's insurance
benefit. . . . We determine from this
that the benefit inures directly to
26

the
child,
notwithstanding
the
prerequisite status of the parent. No
indices of the father's ownership ever
attached to these funds. Thus, the
court is, in effect, ordering the
children to pay the accrued arrearages
for their own support.
Id. at 886. Recognizing the inequities of allowing such credits, the
court further stated:
If we were to allow such credits, the defendant
would receive a windfall, since the delinquent
support payments would be made with the funds of
the social security administration and not with
his own.
If we disallow the credits, the
daughter will receive the benefits of the extra
payments since she will receive not only the
support arrearages but also the monthly social
security checks. As between the two parties, we
feel, as did the Missouri court in McClaskey,
supra, 543 S.W.2d at 835, that "[w]hen the
windfall comes, equitably it should inure not to
the defaulting husband's benefit, but to his
bereft children.
Id.

Finally, the court recognized that another reason equity

requires that credits not be allowed in such situations is that the
child's needs are current and not sometime in the future.

Id.

"To

allow such credits would be to encourage fathers to put off making
their support payments in the hope that some future collateral source
would satisfy their arrearages."

Id.

Consistent with the language of § 407 and the previously stated
case law, the Social Security Administration, Department of Health
and Human Services, by way of letter July 12, 1991, stated that the
Social

Security benefits

received by the minor

child

"may be

considered as support, but this amount is for the child only, and not
for any other purpose."

(Record at 544; letter from Frances R. Darr,

Social Security Administration).
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In the instant case, the minor child, Michelle, is a direct
recipient

of

disability.

Social

Security

benefits

related

to

Defendant's

The benefits received by Michelle are independent of

Defendant's benefits; Defendant receives no more or less by virtue of
benefits

received by Michelle.

The benefits, consistent with

statutory law and case law, are the property of the minor child,
Michelle, not Defendant.
benefits

cannot

and

See Mask, 620 P.2d at 886.

should

not

be

used

obligations to his minor child, Michelle.

to

As such, the

meet

Defendant's

To allow such a credit

would violate the principles of equity and would, in effect, be
requiring Michelle to pay for her own schooling, and in turn, would
be relieving Defendant of his responsibility to do so.

Moreover,

such a credit against Defendant's obligation would be inconsistent
with

the

trial

court's

order

that

Defendant

pay

one-half

of

Michelle's private schooling expenses, especially in light of the
court's specific findings concerning Defendant's desire to maintain
Michelle in private school and his ability to pay.

(Record at 1059,

Finding of Fact 18; Record at 1063, Finding of Fact 30).
Defendant, in his brief, cites United States v. Devalle, 704
F.2d 1513 (11th Cir. 1983), for the proposition that 42 U.S.C.
§ 407(a) is inapplicable when the basic needs of the debtor (i.e.,
the minor child in this case) are satisfied.

Devalle, however, is

distinguishable from the instant case because it involved 11 U.S.C.
§ 1325(b) of the Bankruptcy Code, which specifically modifies the
anti-assignment effect of 42 U.S.C. § 407, but only in bankruptcy
cases. Id. at 1515 and 1518 ("We therefore find that the Bankruptcy
Code must be construed to limit the anti-assignment provision of the
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Social Security Act when the debtor voluntarily submits a Chapter 13
plan.").

Furthermore, nothing in Devalle indicates that the holding

is applicable to a situation where a parent wants to apply his
child's Social Security benefits to satisfy his obligation to support
his child.
In light of the plain language of 42 U.S.C. § 407, case law, and
Social Security Administration policy, the trial court correctly held
that it did not have the power to assign the Social Security benefits
received by the parties' minor

child to satisfy

her

father's

obligation to pay one-half of her private school expenses.
Assuming, arguendo, that § 407 is inapplicable to the instant
case, the trial court, viewing the record as a whole and by virtue of
its eguitable powers in domestic relations cases, did not abuse its
discretion in ruling that Defendant could not receive such a credit.
According to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 .5(8) (a), the trial court, under
Utah law, "may" determine whether or not a credit is appropriate.
In the instant case, the trial court initially granted Defendant
to credit his obligation against the Social Security benefits of the
minor child, Michelle, because it assumed Michelle was receiving
Defendant's money, which is wrong.

However, the court changed its

position when it realized that Defendant's benefits were unaffected
by Michelle's.

In recognizing this distinction, the trial court

stated:
Now, just so that everybody understands, there
was no doubt in my mind, that the reason I made
that ruling was because I felt that the income
to the child, that is this minor's beneficiaries
or dependent's payment was, in effect, earned
and supplied by the father. And I felt, without
knowing, that it probably served to reduce at
,29

least a portion of what he received. That no
being the case, I do have some concerns about
what I did on that part of [the ruling].
(Record at 460-61).

The trial court, in the instant case, indicated

the reasons for refusing Defendant a credit.

First, the court

recognized that the Social Security benefits received by the minor
child belong to her, and as such, should not be used to meet her
father's obligations.

(Record at 1060, Finding of Fact 21).

In

other words, the minor child should not be required to foot the bill
for her own education, especially in light of Defendant's desire that
she attend a private school and his ability to pay.

Second,

Defendant should fulfill his obligations for one-half of the minor
child's private school expenses from his own resources and not from
the minor child's Social Security benefits. (Record at 1060, Finding
of Fact 21).
In Pontbriand v. Pontbriand, 622 A.2d 482 (R.I. 1993), a case
relied upon by Defendant in his opening brief, the Rhode Island
Supreme Court ruled that Social Security benefits paid to dependent
children may be used to offset child support obligations of a
noncustodial parent.

Id. at 485.

A distinguishing aspect of the

Pontbriand court's ruling, however, is the fact that the noncustodial
parent's monthly disability income was reduced by the total amount he
and his dependents were receiving in Social Security benefits.
at 483-84.

This is not the case here.

Id.

As indicated by the letter

from the Social Security Administration, which was submitted to the
trial court, the Social Security benefits paid to the minor child,
Michelle, do not reduce or diminish, by even one dollar, the amount
received by Defendant as the primary beneficiary.
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(Record at 544,

letter from Frances R. Darr, Social Security Administration; Record
at 460-61; Record at 756). To allow Defendant such a credit would
require, in effect, the minor child to pay for her own education.
Finally, by including the income of Plaintiff's husband, i.e.,
the stepparent of the minor child, Michelle, Defendant argues that
the minor child's basic needs are met. Defendant, however, fails to
recognize that, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-4.2, it is the
natural parent's primary obligation to provide support for the minor
child.

By way of comparison between Plaintiff and Defendant,

Defendant is clearly in the best position, economically, to provide
support for Michelle.

As the trial court specifically found,

Defendant's monthly income is over $3029, tax free.

Moreover,

Defendant is single, Michelle being his only child.
In light of principles of equity and fairness in the instant
case, which the court duly considered prior to determining that
Defendant should fulfill his obligations out of his own funds, the
trial court did not abuse its discretion by refusing to credit
Defendant's obligation to pay one-half of private school expenses
with his daughter's Social Security benefits.

3.

THE TRIAL COURT DID NOT ABUSE ITS DISCRETION IN
ALLOWING PLAINTIFF TO SUBMIT EVIDENCE AFTER THE
CONCLUSION OF TRIAL TO ESTABLISH AMOUNTS CLAIMED
AND SOUGHT AT TRIAL.

On appeal, Defendant claims, pursuant to Utah Rule of Civil
Procedure 43(b), that the trial court abused its discretion by
considering evidence after trial on the issues regarding the minor
child's private school expenses and medical and dental expenses. In
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so doing, Defendant fails to set forth the procedural posture leading
to both the court's request and consideration of evidence, of which
Defendant now complains.
Following trial and the court's April 26, 1991 minute entry,
Plaintiff filed a motion for clarification of the court's ruling.
(Record at 292).

In the motion, Plaintiff stated that disputes

concerning the proposed findings of fact and conclusions of law
needed to be resolved, and that certain matters in the court's minute
entry needed clarification.

Following Defendant's response, the

court, on August 7, 1991, held a hearing on the motion.
82).

(Record 419-

At the hearing, the trial court ordered Plaintiff to submit a

motion to amend, pursuant to Utah Code of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501,
addressing the following:

(1) whether Defendant should receive a

credit for the minor child's Social Security benefits; (2) the amount
of expenses paid by Plaintiff to maintain the minor child in private
school; and (3) both the amount of the medical and dental expenses
and transportation expenses paid for by Plaintiff.
459).

(Record at 292,

In the process, the trial court did not provide a deadline for

filing the motion (Record at 460, lines 5-8), but instead allowed for
its filing at "any time;"

the court allowed Defendant thirty days

for response, rather than the Rule 4-501(1)(b) ten-day response time.
(Record at 13-22).

The court, in setting the thirty-day response

time, sought to provide Defendant with the opportunity to take
depositions and anything else in response.

(Record at 459-60).

Because of the large amount of information and time required to
accumulate the information requested by the court, Plaintiff, on
November 1, 1991, in accordance with the trial court's directive,
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filed her Motion for Post-trial Determination of Divorce Modification
Issues.

(Record at 527-731). Defendant responded with his untimely

memorandum in opposition on December 6, 1991, which was more than the
thirty days granted by the court for response.6

(Record at 747-53).

Defendant filed a Supplement on December 16, 1991 (Record at 777),
and then he filed an "Answer" to the Plaintiff's "Motion for PostTrial Determination of Divorce Modification Issues" on December 17,
1991.

(Record

at

780).

Plaintiff

filed

motions

to

strike

Defendant's untimely Supplement and Answer (Record at 759 and 788),
which the court granted.

(Record at 798).

Rule 43(b), Utah Rules of Civil Procedure, states, "When a
motion is based on facts not appearing of record the court may hear
the matter on affidavits presented by the respective parties, but the
court may direct that the matter be heard wholly or partly on oral
testimony or depositions." (Emphasis added). In addition, Utah Code
of Jud. Admin. Rule 4-501(3), provides that a request for hearing
"shall be granted unless the court finds that . . . the dispositive
issue or set of issues governing the granting or denial of the motion
has been authoritatively decided."
As a threshold matter, the trial court had the authority to
consider Plaintiff's motion under Rule 60(b), Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure. Although there is no provision in the Utah Rules of Civil
Procedure for a motion to clarify, Plaintiff's request to obtain
relief from and clarify the court's initial judgment was sufficient

6

Notwithstanding Defendant's untimely filing, the court
considered Defendant's memorandum. (Record at 796).
33

to invoke relief under Rule 60(b)(7). See Kunzler v. O'Neil, 215 UAR
57, 58-59 (Utah App. 1993).
The trial court appropriately exercised its discretion by not
holding an evidentiary hearing on the motion.

The matters had been

primarily and authoritatively decided by the court at trial.

As

indicated by the findings of fact and conclusions of law, the trial
court laboriously considered the evidence and then ruled accordingly.
Because the matters raised by the pleadings were decided based on
both the extensive submissions by the parties and the evidence
admitted

at

superfluous.

trial,

an

evidentiary

hearing

would

have

been

Further, the issues concerning the amount of expenses

were, for the most part, resolved by correspondence and meetings
between the parties in the process of arriving at a stipulation.
(Record 1039-41).

As such, the situation in the instant case does

not present the situation contemplated in Stan Katz Real Estate, Inc.
v. Chavez, 565 P.2d 1142, 1143 (Utah 1977).
Because the trial court primarily and authoritcitively resolved
the issues, making an additional hearing superfluous, because the
parties submitted extensive information concerning the issues to the
court, which it diligently considered, and because the parties
resolved a majority of the disputed matters by stipulation, the trial
court did not abuse discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit
evidence regarding that amounts claimed and sought at trial. For the
same reasons, the trial court appropriately exercised its discretion,
pursuant to Rule 43, in deciding the matters based on the extensive
submissions and stipulations of the parties.
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4.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
REFUSING TO MODIFY THE DIVORCE DECREE TO REQUIRE
DEFENDANT TO PAY AN INCREASED AMOUNT OF CHILD
SUPPORT.

In the course of refusing to increase Plaintiff's child support
obligation by modification, the trial court found that there had not
been a substantial change in circumstances. (Record at 1055, Finding
of Fact 7).

Such a finding is clearly erroneous, and the court

abused its discretion in refusing to modify the Decree to require
Defendant to pay increased child support.
An appellate court gives "great deference to the trial court's
findings of fact" and "will not overturn them unless they are clearly
erroneous."

Riche v. Riche, 784 P.2d 465, 467 (Utah App. 1989).

In

challenging the trial court's findings, a party must "marshal the
evidence which supports the finding[s] and then demonstrate that,
despite this evidence, they are clearly erroneous."

Christensen v.

Munns, 812 P.2d 69, 73 (Utah App. 1991); accord Riche v. Riche, 784
P. 2d 465

(Utah App. 1989).

The trial court's decision as to

modification of a divorce decree will not be disturbed absent an
abuse of discretion.

Hagan v. Hagan, 810 P.2d 478, 481 (Utah App.

1991) (citing Jense v. Jense, 784 P.2d 1249, 1251 (Utah App. 1989));
accord Myers v. Myers, 768 P.2d 979, 984 (Utah App. 1991).
In accordance with the marshaling requirement, the following
evidence supports the trial court's finding that there has not been
a substantial change in circumstances warranting an increase in child
support:
1.
Evidence that Plaintiff has a minimum gross income of
$833.00 per month, that she earned a profit of approximately
$4493.00 in 1990 from her costume business, that she utilized a
rental write-off of $5400.00 for her home business, and that
35

Plaintiff has the ability to write off substantial expenses from
her taxes through her business (Record at 1055-56, Finding of
Fact 7);
2.
Defendant's statement that he was willing to pay child
support of $300.00 per month, and that he "acknowledged" that
such amount was higher than the sum calculated under the child
support guidelines (Record at 1056, Finding of Fact 8); 7
3.
The trial court's opinion, as adduced from exhibits and
testimony of both parties, that evidence at trial did not fully
reveal the nature and extent of the parties' respective incomes,
and that, according to the court's judgment, the parties' income
does not justify a finding of a substantial change of
circumstances (Record at 1056-57, Finding of Facts 9 and 10).
Despite the aforementioned evidence, the trial court clearly
erred in finding that there had not been a substantial change in
circumstances justifying an increase in child support.

The court

found that Plaintiff, at the time of entry of the original Decree,
had a gross income of $28,687.24 per year or $2390.60 per month
(Record at 1055, Finding of Fact 4).

In contrast, the court further

found that Plaintiff, at the time the petition was filed, had an
income of $10,000.00 per year or $833.00 per month.
Finding of Fact 6).

(Record at 1055,

This decrease constitutes over a sixty-five

percent reduction in income since the time the original Decree was
entered.

As to Defendant's income at the time of the original

Decree, the court found that he was receiving a disability net income
of $1600.00.

This is in stark contrast to Defendant's tax-free

disability and Social Security income in excess of $36,351.00 per

7

Defendant's acknowledgement was mistaken.
Based on a
calculation using the Child Support Obligation Worksheet set forth in
Addendum C, Defendant child support obligation exceeds $300.00.
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year or $3029.26 per month at the time the petition was filed.8
(Record at 1055, Findings of Fact 4 and 5).

The trial court, in

arriving at its finding regarding a lack of substantial change in
circumstances, failed to consider the

"standard of

living and

situation of the partiesf" the "relative wealth and income of the
parties,"

the

"ability

of

the

Obligor

to

earn,"

or

the

"responsibilities of the obligor and the obligee for the support of
others."

See Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7(2)(a)-(c), and (g).

Notwithstanding its findings, the trial court erred by not
imputing additional income to Defendant based on his work history,
occupation, gualifications, and employment potential. See Utah Code
Ann. § 78-45-7.5(6) and (7)(b).

Under § 78-45-7.5(7), the trial

court has to impute income if the court finds that the parent is
voluntarily underemployed.

Such is the case here.9

Therefore, the

court erred by not imputing additional income to Defendant.

Cf.

Cummings v. Cummings, 821 P.2d 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991); Proctor v.
Proctor, 773 P.2d 1389, 1390 n.l (Utah App. 1989); see Argument five
below.
In

addition

to

the

disparity

in the

parties' income, a

substantial change in circumstances has occurred by virtue of the
additional expenditures by Plaintiff to maintain the minor child,

8

Although the court noted that Defendant's disability and
Social Security income was tax free, it failed to adjust his income
accordingly so as to accurately reflect the relative tax-free
benefits on his income. (See Argument #5 Supra).
9

Under Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5( 7) (d), income may not be
imputed if "a parent if physically . . . disabled to the extent that
he cannot earn minimum wage." However, as indicated more fully below
in Argument five, Defendant, can and is able, at the very least, to
earn minimum wage.
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Michelle,

in

constitute

private

school.

a substantial

These

additional

increase over the amount

expenditures
required to

maintain Michelle in private preschool at the time of the original
Decree.

(Record at 1059; 1135, lines 6-7; 1139, lines 17-19; and

548-657).

Since the original Decree, Plaintiff has also lost both

her health care benefits and her TWA flight benefits, requiring
additional expenditures on Michelle's behalf.

(Record at 35-39, 41,

658-720, 1058, and 1126,; Plaintiff's Exhibit 5).
Based on the foregoing, the trial court clearly erred in finding
that no substantial change in circumstances had occurred.

In

addition,

of

the

foregoing

evidence

indicates

a

clear

abuse

discretion by the trial court in refusing to modify the Decree to
require Defendant to pay an increased child support.

5.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION BY
REFUSING TO IMPUTE ADDITIONAL
INCOME TO
DEFENDANT BASED UPON HIS PAST-EARNINGS HISTORY
AND LIFESTYLE.

Plaintiff does not challenge the trial court's findings insofar
as Defendant's tax-free disability income is concerned. However, the
trial court, pursuant to Utah Code Ann. § 7 8-45-7.5(6) and (7), erred
by not imputing income to Defendant based on employment potential and
probable

earnings

as derived

from

his

employment

history

and

occupation qualifications.
The trial court is accorded considerable discretion in adjusting
the financial interests of divorced parties, and thus the trial
court's actions in this regard are "entitled to a presumption of
validity."

Cummings v. Cumminas, 821 P.2d 472, 480 (Utah App. 1991)
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(guoting Hansen v. Hansen, 736 P.2d 1055, 1056 (Utah App. 1987)).
Notwithstanding this presumption, the trial court's determination
will be upset on appeal when "the evidence clearly preponderates to
the contrary" or the appellate court determines that the trial court
has abused its discretion."

Ostler v. Ostler, 789 P.2d 713, 715

(Utah App. 1990); Cummings, 821 P.2d at 480.
According to § 78-45-7.5(6), "Gross income includes income
imputed to the parent under Subsection (7)."

Subsection (7)(a)

provides that "income may not be imputed to a parent unless . . . a
hearing is held and a finding made that the parent is voluntarily
unemployed or underemployed."
The trial court received evidence concerning Defendant's sources
of income and whether he was voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(Record at 1243, 1256-58).

In light of the uncontroverted evidence

that Defendant continued to work after obtaining his disability
(Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62), the court, nevertheless, failed
to make a finding that Defendant is voluntarily unemployed or
underemployed. Furthermore, the trial court failed to make a finding
that Defendant was disabled to the point that he cannot work.10

See

Erwin v. Erwin, 773 P.2d 847, 848-49 (Utah App. 1989) (discussing how
"court is reguired to 'find the facts specially' and thus ground its
decision on findings of fact which resolve the material factual
uncertainties); Painter v. Painter, 752 P. 2d 907, 909 (Utah App.

10

Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7.5(d)(ii) provides that " [i]ncome may
not be imputed if . . . a parent is physically or mentally disabled
to the extent he cannot earn minimum wage." The evidence in the
instant case indicates that Defendant, as shown by his postdisability work history, clearly has the ability to earn at least
minimum wage.
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1988) (holding that "to ensure the court acted within its discretion,
the facts and reasons for the court's decision must be set forth
fully in appropriate findings and conclusions").
Defendant testified at trial about the various jobs he had held
since receiving his disability.

(Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62).

Over that period of time, Defendant worked in several security
officer and security consultant positions.11

(Record at 1260-62).

As the record indicates, this is not a case where the individual is
totally disabled or cannot function.

Rather, Defendant's post-

disability-determination work history clearly shows that he is able
to perform various strenuous activities.

For example, Defendant

attended anti-terrorist training schools (Record at 1260), hosted the
annual Moose Lips Lodge Trout Tournament — which involved strenuous
hiking, wading, and walking through various rivers, streams, and
lakes in Montana

(Record at 1263), and purchased a house that

included multiple levels and stairs to climb and over thirty-three
acres of land.
Finally,

(Record at 1249-52).
Defendant's

lifestyle

supports

an

inference

of

additional income that the court should have imputed to Defendant's
gross income.

Defendant, at the time of the petition, owned three

vehicles free and clear, namely, a four-wheel drive truck, a Mercedes
Benz, and a $53,000.00 Ferrari.

(Record at 1239-40).

Defendant

testified that the Ferrari requires a $400.00 per month expenditure
for maintenance.

(Record at 1056).

11

Furthermore, continues to host

At trial, Defendant admitted that, subsequent to receiving
his disability, he worked sixteen hours a day, six days a week, for
two and a half years. (Record at 1243).
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an annual five-day fishing tournament for approximately 12 to 13
people

(Record at 1263).

Based upon the evidence, the trial court abused its discretion
in refusing to impute additional income to Defendant based on his
employment potential and probable earnings as derived from work
history, occupation qualifications, prevailing earnings for similar
positions, and lifestyle. Accordingly, this Court should remand the
instant case for adequate findings concerning Defendant's voluntary
unemployment and the extent of his disability.

6.

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED BY REFUSING TO ADJUST
DEFENDANT'S TAX-FREE INCOME TO REFLECT — FOR
PURPOSES OF CHILD SUPPORT CALCULATION — A GROSS
INCOME EQUIVALENT TO A TAXABLE INCOME.

At trial, Defendant testified that his disability or pension
income was tax free.

(Record at 1231).

In order to show the true

value of Defendant's disability income as related to the calculation
of child support, Plaintiff, by exhibit, attempted to illustrate how
the tax-free disability income should be adjusted to compensate for
its tax-free status and convert it into a taxable gross.12 Plaintiff
then requested that the trial court take judicial notice of the fact
that Defendant's income, when multiplied by the applicable tax
bracket multiplier, reflects Defendant's true taxable gross. (Record
at 1234).

However, the court refused to take judicial notice of the

"proper application" of the applicable tax factor to Defendant's

12

Because the Child Support Guidelines are calculated based on
a taxable gross, and because Defendant's pension income is tax free,
Plaintiff, by utilizing the applicable tax brackets in an exhibit,
converted the tax-free pension income into taxable income. (Record
at 1231) .
41

pension income.

(Record at 1234).

The trial court, in so doing,

erred by refusing to judicially notice at least an approximate
adjustment of Defendant's tax-free pension income.
Pursuant to Utah Rule of Evidence 201(b),

"[a] judicially

noticed fact must be one not subject to reasonable dispute in that it
is either (1) generally known within the territorial jurisdiction of
the trial court or (2) capable of accurate and ready determination by
resort to sources whose accuracy cannot reasonably be guestioned."
Rule 201(d) provides that a "court shall take judicial notice if
reguested by a party and supplied with the necessary information.
The trial court's refusal to take judicial notice is reviewed for
correction of error.

See Redevelopment Agency of Roy v. JonesF 743

P.2d 1233, 1235 (Utah App. 1987).
In the instant case, the approximate impact of the applicable
tax factor to Defendant's income is capable of accurate and ready
determination

by

resort

to

sources

that

cannot

reasonably

be

guestioned.

Plaintiff not only reguested that the court take

judicial notice, but she supplied the necessary information for the
court to do so.

(Record at 1233-34).

The trial court erred by not

judicially noticing this fact.
Even if this Court determines that Plaintiff did not provide the
court with the necessary information under Rule 201(d), the trial
court abused its discretion by not at least approximating the taxfree benefits of the disability income to Defendant under subsection
(c).

Under subsection (c), the trial court, as a matter of eguity,

should have adjusted Defendant's income in some way to reflect the
tax-free benefits of his disability income.
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Under Utah Code Ann.

§ 78-45-7.5, the trial court has a responsibility to determine the
gross income of the parties, which it failed to do.

The court's

refusal to do so, by not adjusting for Defendant's tax-free pension,
was an abuse of discretion.

7.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ADMITTING DEFENDANT'S MEDICAL TESTIMONY WITHOUT
ANY EXPERT TESTIMONY OR MEDICAL FOUNDATION.

At trial, Defendant testified that, due to his disability, he
was unable to work to supplement his disability income.
1199-1204).

(Record at

In the process, Defendant testified, without any

substantiating medical expert testimony, that he suffered from three
diseases, namely, a thyroid disease, ulcer disease, and heart
disease.

(Record at 1199).

In addition, Defendant testified that he

suffered from Post-Traumatic Stress Syndrome.

(Record at 1201).

Plaintiff timely objected and moved to strike, but the court admitted
the testimony.

(Record at 1199).

The trial court abused its

discretion in admitting Defendant's testimony without any kind of
medical foundation.
"As a general rule, it is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine . . . whether particular [expert testimony] would
be helpful and suitable in a particular case."

GAW v. State ex re

Dep't of Trans. , 798 P.2d 1130, 1134 (Utah App. 1990).

"The critical

factor is whether the expert has knowledge that can assist the trier
of fact in resolving the issues before it." Schindler v. Schindler,
776 P.2d 84, 89 (Utah App. 1989).
Here, through evidence presented at trial, Plaintiff showed that
Defendant had been engaged in several employment positions since
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receiving his disability*

(Record at 1243, 1255-58, 1260-62).

Defendant admitted that he used these positions of employment to
supplement his tax-free disability income,

(Record at 1255-58).

Plaintiff also showed that Defendant is not disabled to the extent
that he cannot work. To the contrary, Defendant regularly engaged in
strenuous physical activities.

(Record 1260, 1262, 1249-52).

By

allowing Defendant to testify concerning his own medical condition,
without any medical foundation, the trial court allowed Defendant to
rebut the evidence that he worked to supplement his disability
income. By so doing, the trial court allowed Defendant to rebut the
evidence going to his ability to work with self-serving statements
based

on

inadmissible

hearsay.

Such

testimony

was

highly

prejudicial, contributing to the trial court's refusal to grant an
increase of child support. Expert testimony would have assisted the
trial court in determining to what extent Defendant was disabled,
thereby enabling the court to accurately consider Defendant's income
and ability to supplement his disability income.

8.

THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS DISCRETION IN
ENTERING JUDGMENT AGAINST PLAINTIFF FOR ONE-HALF
THE COSTS OF TRANSPORTATION FOR DEFENDANT'S
VISITATION WITH THE MINOR CHILD FROM AND AFTER
THE DATE OF FILING OF THE AMENDED PETITION TO
MODIFY THE DECREE OF DIVORCE.

Plaintiff,

as

part

of

her

amended

petition,

sought

a

modification of the stipulated Divorce Decree requiring Defendant to
pay for visitation transportation expenses. The original California
Decree required Plaintiff to pay transportation costs for the travel
of the minor child, Michelle, from Salt Lake City to Los Angeles and
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back again for visitation with Defendant.

(Plaintiff's Exhibit 10,

p. 12, parag. 4), At that time, Plaintiff, through the benefits of
her employment with TWA, could provide free air travel for Michelle.
(Record at 1122).

It was the parties' understanding, agreement, and

contemplation at the time of the divorce settlement that Plaintiff
would pay for Michelle's visitation transportation

"as long as

[Plaintiff was] employed at TWA and pass benefits remain[ed] the same
as of the date of the Marital Settlement Agreement."
Exhibit

6, p. 2, parag. 3f, Record at 1122-23).

(Plaintiff's
Plaintiff's

employment with TWA subsequently terminated, and Defendant moved from
Los Angeles to Montana.

(Record at 1126).

Because Plaintiff's

obligation to pay visitation transportation expenses ceased upon both
the termination of her employment with TWA and Defendant's relocation
to Montana, the trial court abused its discretion in requiring
Plaintiff

to

pay

one-half

of

the

transportation

expenses

for

visitation with Defendant in Montana.
To obtain modification of a decree, a party must show that there
has been a substantial change in circumstances subsequent to the
decree that was not contemplated in the original decree. Woodward v.
Woodward, 709 P.2d 393, 394 (Utah 1985) (per curiam); Muir v. Muir,
841 P.2d 736, 739 (Utah App. 1992); Utah Code Ann. § 78-45-7 (1992).
The trial court's modification determination is reviewed for abuse of
discretion.

Muir, 841 P.2d at 739.

In the instant case, the trial court correctly found that there
had been a substantial change in circumstances regarding the payment
of transportation expenses.
trial

court

failed

(Record at 1058). Notwithstanding, the

to make

adequate
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findings

to

support

its

determination that Defendant only pay one-half of the visitation
transportation

expenses.

The

court

abused

its

discretion

in

requiring Plaintiff to pay one-half of the visitation transportation
expenses because Defendant, based on Defendant's increase in income
as compared to Plaintiff's significant decrease in income, is in a
better position to pay the transportation expenses.
Defendant had the ability to pay.

Moreover,

The original California Decree

requires Plaintiff to provide visitation transportation at a time
when she, by virtue of her flight benefits with TWA, could do so at
little or no cost. Furthermore, the trial court failed to recognize
that, upon Plaintiff's termination of flight benefits, and upon
Defendant's voluntary move from Los Angeles to Montana, the original
Decree, together with the requirement that Plaintiff pay for the
visitation transportation, ended upon its own terms.

CONCLUSION
For the aforementioned reasons, this Court should affirm the
trial court's rulings requiring Defendant to pay one-half of the
minor child's private school expenses, and that Defendant not be
allowed to offset his obligation to pay such expenses against the
minor child's Social Security benefits.

Further, the court did not

abuse its discretion in allowing Plaintiff to submit post-trial
documentation to clarify and establish amounts sought at trial.
However, this Court should reverse both the trial court's refusal to
require Defendant to pay increased child support and the refusal to
adjust

Defendant's

tax-free

income

equivalent to a taxable gross income.
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to

reflect

a

gross

income

Finally, this Court should

reverse the trial court's decision to admit Defendant's medical
testimony and the trial court's judgment against Plaintiff for onehalf of the visitation transportation expenses.

Date:
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H

, 1993.

Randall J,
Attorney fc
Appellee anc
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IN THE THIRD DISTRICT COURT IN AND FOR SALT LAKE COUNTY
STATE OF UTAH
JO ANN BROOKS (NUNLEY),
Plaintiff,
vs.
THOMAS M. BROOKS,
Defendant.

]
]
.]
) Case No. C 88 4192
]
]) Judge Richard H. Moffat

FINDINGS OF FACT AND CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat. Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her
attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and

files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry
on the 26th day of April, 1991.
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991.
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order,
portions of the April 26,1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3, 1991

2

Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991.
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administration. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling
dated December 19,1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992.
On or about March 6, 1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school,
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19,
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992.
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3, 1991 and January 10,
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court does now make, adopt and
find the following:

FINDINGS OF FACT
1.

Plaintiff and Defendant were divorced on the 14th day of August, 1985 in the

State of California pursuant to a written divorce settlement agreement
2.

Plaintiff and Defendant were awarded joint legal and physical custody of the

minor child, Michelle Nohealani Brooks, now age 11, born September 18, 1980. Plaintiff
was awarded the primary physical custody of said child and Defendant was awarded
specified custodial rights with said child, and Plaintiff, JO ANN NUNLEY (BROOKS), was
ordered to bear the expense of the transportation of the minor child to and from Los
Angeles, California to visit the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, during his on-schedule
custodial period.
3.

The Decree of Divorce required the Defendant to pay to Plaintiff child

support in the sum of $300.00 per month on the 1st day of each month commencing on the
1st day of August, 1985, and continuing until the said child reaches the age of eighteen (18),
joins the armed forces, is fully employed, is married, is emancipated or upon her death.
Plaintiff was further ordered to pay to Defendant $100.00 per month as child support if the
minor child resided with the Defendant for sixteen (16) days or more in any month.
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4.

The Court finds that at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce, the

Plaintiff was employed with TWA Airlines, with a gross year-end income of $28,687.24, or
a gross monthly amount of $2,390.60. The Court finds that the Defendant was receiving
disability income at the time of the entry of the Decree of Divorce and, pursuant to the
Settlement Agreement of the parties, had a net income of $1,600.00 per month.
5.

The Court finds that the Defendant, THOMAS M. BROOKS, has a current

gross income of $3,029.26 per month. The Court bases thisfindingon all of the evidence
submitted at trial, including the evidence that his disability and social security income is taxfree, and including his income producing capabilities, and the Court believes that the finding
is based on due consideration of all of the evidence.
6.

The Court finds that the income of the Plaintiff is approximately $10,000.00

per year (or about $833.00 per month), based upon the stipulated testimony of the Plaintiff
at trial, and the Courtfindsthat her imputed income should be approximately $833.00 per
month. The Court did not find evidence to support a finding that Plaintiff was earning more
than her stipulated income of $10,000.00 per year.
7.

The Court finds that there has not been a substantial and material change of

circumstances based upon its finding that Plaintiff has a minimum of $833.00 gross per
month from her costume business, and further that she earned a profit of approximately
$4,493.00 for the tax year 1990 from her costume business, that she had incorporated into
her tax return a rental write-off of $5,400.00 while operating this business out of her home,
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and that the Plaintiff had the ability to write-off substantial amounts of expenses through
her business, without being required to take money from the business in a taxable form.
The Court notes that the Defendant claims a $400.00 per month expenditure to maintain
his Ferrari automobile and that the total of Defendant's checking account deposits for the
period May 16,1988 through July 17,1990, shows approximately $173,000.00 of deposits and
$171,000.00 of withdrawals. While there are certain explanations made which could explain
some of the discrepancy, it certainly did not describe or explain away all of the discrepancy
as to the Defendant's expenditures.
8.

The Court farther finds that the Defendant stated that he was willing to pay

child support at the rate of $300.00 per month for his share of the minor child's daily needs,
and acknowledged that said amount was higher than the sum calculated under the Uniform
Child Support Worksheet.
9.

The Court is of the opinion that the exhibits and testimony produced by both

parties at the time of the trial do not fully reveal the nature and extent of their respective
incomes and, therefore, the Court cannot draw any more specific findings from the evidence
presented at the time of the trial as to either party's income.
10.

The Court finds from the evidence presented and its additional findings set

forth above, that Plaintiff and Defendant clearly have additional income which the Court
has not been able to compute and arrive at a figure for each party. The Court's best
judgment is that it is at a level which does not justify a finding of a substantial change of
6

material circumstances and, therefore, the child support sum of $300.00 per month should
be left in place, particularly in view of the Defendant's willingness to keep the child support
at its current level of $300.00 per month.
11.

For all of the above-said reasons, the Court found that the Plaintiff had failed

to prove a material and substantial change of circumstances to justify the increase in child
support sought by the Plaintiff in this matter.
12.

The Courtfinds,as to the visitation transportation expenses, that the reason

and basis upon which the original transportation order in this matter was entered (i.e., the
California Divorce Decree) was that Plaintiff was then employed by TWA airlines and could
thus provide free transportation, or at least it was contemplated that Plaintiff could provide
free transportation, for the minor child from Salt Lake City to Defendant's home in Los
Angeles. The Court further finds that Plaintiff is no longer employed by TWA and cannot
provide free transportation for the minor child.
13.

The Court notes that Plaintiffs husband (an airline employee) has access to

passes and/or discount fares for his family. The Court finds that it is willing to find that
Plaintiff should ask her husband to secure discount tickets for travel of the minor child to
and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should
then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary part of the ticket indicating the
amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one
(1) week prior to the flight. The Court finds that if Defendant does not reimburse Plaintiff
7

for his one-half, then no visitation should occur. The Court finds that such visitation should
be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled visitation and all parties
should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. The Court also finds that if Plaintiffs
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff should
then buy the.tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the
conditions set forth above. The Courts finds that the Plaintiff should cooperate in seeing
that the Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the
California Decree of Divorce.
14.

The Courtfindsthat in addition to the above loss of Plaintiffs TWA benefits

that the Defendant has moved from Los Angeles, California to Montana and the Court
finds, in a technical sense, that Plaintiffs responsibihty for payment of transportation for the
minor child's visit would terminate upon that condition.
15.

Without relying on the technical statement above, the Court is of the opinion

that clearly the parties contemplated the furnishing of that transportation through Plaintiff
employment as a perk, at no cost to the Plaintiff, and on that basis, she was willing to
provide the benefit to the parties.
16.

The Court finds that all of the above constitute a sufficient, substantial and

material change of circumstances to require each party to share equally the costs of
transportation for Defendant's visitation until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and
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graduates from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until
further order of this Court.
17.

The Courtfindsthat Plaintiff should reimburse Defendant for one-half of the

transportation costs that Defendant has reasonably incurred in exercising his visitation rights
with the minor child of the parties. Based upon the Court's review of Plaintiffs and
Defendant's "Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request", said expenses total
$2,534.50 for visitation expenses from NoVember 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991.
Therefore, Plaintiff should be ordered to pay Defendant for one-half of $2,534.50 or
$1,267.25 and judgment should enter accordingly.
18.

The Court finds that the Plaintiff has enrolled the minor child in a private

school, Rowland-Hall St. Mark's, and that she has expended substantial sums of money to
keep said child in a private school. The Court further finds that both Plaintiff and
Defendant are desirous for their child to be enrolled in private school. The Courtfindsthat
the Defendant noted that he did not believe that he had the ability to maintain the costs to
maintain the minor child in private school.
19.

The Court finds that Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the

private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities, and school uniforms from the date
of Plaintiffs Amended Petition, November 21, 1988, when this issue was first raised by
Plaintiff, until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court.
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20.

The Court finds that subsequent to the trial in this matter, Plaintiff presented

a letter, over the objection of Defendant's counsel, from an employee of the Social Security
Administration, dated July 12,1991, indicating that the Court could not assign or determine
how benefits paid to the minor child could be used. The Court was subsequently requested
by counsel for Plaintiff to permit the filing of a Motion for Post-Trial Determination of this
social security issue and the Court found that the matter should be submitted to it under
Rule 4-501 of the Code of Judicial Administration. Defendant was to respond to that
Motion within thirty (30) days after filing and no sooner than the 6th of September, 1991.
21.

The Court finds, after review of the matters submitted to it under the "Motion

for Post-Trial Determination," that contrary to its April 26, 1991 trial Minute Entry, it does
not have the power to assign the social security auxiliary benefits received by the parties'
minor child (by reason of Defendant's permanent disability) to meet the Defendant's
obUgation to pay one-half of the child's private-school expenses. The social security
auxiliary benefits received by the minor child do not reduce the disability benefits otherwise
due to or received by the Defendant and, in fact, said auxiliary benefits are for the minor
child's use only and cannot be judicially assigned or designated for any other use. The
Court finds that the Defendant should meet his obHgations for one-half of the minor child's
private school expenses from his own resources and not from the child's social security
benefits.
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22.

The Court finds, based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that the parties have agreed that Plaintiff has
incurred the sum of $19,160.00 for Michelle's private school expenses which include tuition,
interest, insurance, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from November
21,1988 through September 16, 1991. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff
one-half of said amount, or $9,580.00, and judgment should enter accordingly.
23.

The Courtfinds,based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court Request," that Plaintiff has incurred an additional sum of
$5,801.38 for Michelle's private school expenses which include school activities, supplies and
school uniforms. The Court finds that Defendant should pay Plaintiff one-half of said
amount, or $2,900.69, and judgment should enter accordingly.
24.

The Court further finds that the parties should share equally the cost of such

expenses that are incurred after September 16,1991 until the child ceases to attend private
school or until further order of this Court.
25.

The Courtfinds,based upon the information provided under the "Motion for

Post-Trial Determination," and the Court's review of Plaintiffs and Defendant's "Response
to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request," that the Plaintiff has incurred medical, dental
and prescription expenses (not covered by insurance) from November 21, 1988 through
11

March 31,1992, for the minor child, Michelle, of $1,157.24. The Court finds that Defendant
should pay Plaintiff one-half of said amount, or $578.62, and judgment should enter
accordingly.
26.

The Court finds that the parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992,

one-half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription
expenses for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has
graduated from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until
further order of this Court.
27.

The Court finds that while the extracurricular activities of the minor child as

shown on Plaintiffs trial Exhibit 5, may be advantageous to the minor child and may be
desirable, the Court finds that the Defendant should not be obHgated to pay one-half of
those expenses.
28.

The Court finds that it has no intention at this point in ruling that Plaintiff is

at risk to return Michelle's benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that
the Defendant is not legally disabled.
29.

The Court finds that the amounts awarded to Plaintiff and against Defendant

by way of judgment (in parag. 22 above) for the minor child's private school tuition, books,
supplies, school activities and school uniforms is $12,480.69. Defendant's one-half share of
Michelle's medicals is $578.62. The total of $13,059.31 should be reduced by the judgment
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entered against Plaintiff for reimbursement of visitation transportation costs of $1,267.25,
leaving a judgment owing in Plaintiffs favor against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
30.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining the obligations he is to pay on behalf of the parties'
minor child. The Court finds that Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed
herein.
31.

The Court finds that both Plaintiff and Defendant have incurred attorneys'

fees in this matter. The Court finds that neither of the parties are entitled to an award of
attorney's fees from the other and that each should bear their own expenses and fees.
From the foregoing Findings of Fact, the Court now makes and adopts the following:

CONCLUSIONS OF LAW
1.

Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child, should be

denied.
2.

The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support should remain in full force
and effect.
3.

A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the

Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all
13

transportation costs should be amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court. Plaintiff should be ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure
discount tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiffs
husband is willing to do so, Plaintiff should then send a photocopy of the front page of the
itinerary part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse
Plaintiff for his one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does
not reimburse Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no
visitation should occur. Such visitation should be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior
to the scheduled visitation and all parties should cooperate to effectuate these arrangements.
If Plaintiffs husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so,
Plaintiff should then buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement
under the conditions set forth above. The parties should cooperate in seeing that the
Defendant has all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California
Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant should be awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half of those

amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his visitation from
November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25.
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5.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms and
school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September 16,
1991.
6.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and school uniforms in the
sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991.
7.

Plaintiff should be awarded a judgment against the Defendant for his share

of the minor child's medical, dental and prescription expenses in the sum of $578.62 from
November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992.
8.

The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied

toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,059.31, leaving a new
amount in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant should pay one-half of the minor child's private school

tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from September 16,1991 until
the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of this Court.
10.

On the social security issue, the Court hereby amends its prior ruling in its

Minute Entry of April 26, 1991 and awards all amounts that have been paid to the minor
child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received (due to
Defendant's permanent disability) to the minor child as her proceeds, and the same are not
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to be credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover
her private school costs,
11.

The parties should share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-half of the

insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses for the
minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court.
12.

The Defendant should not be obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's

extracurricular activities.
13.

The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's

benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally
disabled.
14.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties'
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein.
15.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant should be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs

in this matter, and each should assume and pay their own fees incurred.
16.

All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or

altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect.
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ORDER MODIFYING DECREE OF DIVORCE
Plaintiffs "Amended Petition for Modification of Decree of Divorce" and Defendant's
"Countermotion" came on regularly for trial on the 22nd day of April, 1991 before the
Honorable Richard H. Moffat.

Plaintiff appeared in person and by and through her

attorney of record, Randall J. Holmgren. Defendant appeared in person and by and
through his attorney of record, Paul H. Liapis. The Court heard the sworn testimony of
Plaintiff and Defendant, marked and received documents and exhibits in support of the
positions of Plaintiff and Defendant, heard arguments of counsel, reviewed the records and

files herein and, took the matter under advisement and thereafter issued its Minute Entry
on the 26th day of April, 1991.
Following the issuance of said Minute Entry, the Plaintiff filed a Motion for
Clarification of Ruling and Defendant filed a Countermotion for Attorney Fees. Defendant
submitted proposed Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law to the Court on or about June
3, 1991, and Plaintiff objected to those proposed Findings and Conclusions and submitted
her own proposed Findings of Fact (with footnotes indicating the portions of the Court's
April 26, 1991 Minute Entry and Defendant's proposed Findings of Fact needing
clarification). The Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification and the Defendant's Countermotion
for Attorney Fees were heard on August 7, 1991.
The Court entered an Order (Re: Plaintiffs Motion for Clarification of Ruling and
Defendant's Countermotion for Attorney Fees) on December 3, 1991. In said Order,
portions of the April 26,1991 Minute Entry were clarified and other portions were reserved
for further review. In particular, said Order directed Plaintiff to submit a motion and
supporting memorandum to the Court, pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Code of Judicial
Administration, addressing the issues that the Court reserved for further review. The Court
directed that entry of the Findings of Fact, Conclusions of Law, and Divorce Modification
Order be delayed until such time as such post-trial motion was submitted and ruled on so
that the issues thereby resolved, together with the issues clarified by the December 3,1991
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Order, could be included in the final Findings, Conclusions, and modification of decree
Order pertaining to the April 22, 1991.
On or about November 1, 1991, Plaintiff submitted her "Motion for Post-Trial
Determination of Divorce Modification Issues," as directed by the Court. The Motion was
opposed by Defendant. The matter was submitted to the Court in accordance with Rule 4501 of the Utah Code of Judicial Administrajion. The Court issued a Minute Entry ruling
dated December 19,1991 and entered an "Order (Re: Motion for Post-Trial Determination
of Divorce Modification Issues)" on January 10, 1992.
On or about March 6,1992, upon the request of the Defendant, the Court instructed
Plaintiff and Defendant to submit an accounting to the Court with respect to the amounts
expended by Plaintiff on behalf of the parties' minor child, Michelle, for private school,
tuition, books, uniforms, school supplies and school activities, and medical, dental and
prescription expenses. Accordingly, on or about May 15, 1992, Defendant submitted
"Defendant's Response to Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request." On or about May 19,
1992, Plaintiff submitted "Plaintiffs Response and Objection to 'Defendant's Response to
Accounting Pursuant to Court's Request'." Pursuant to Rule 4-501 of the Utah Rules of
Judicial Administration, the Court issued a Minute Entry ruling dated July 22, 1992.
The Court having duly considered the foregoing, incorporates herein its trial ruling
(i.e., 4/26/91 Minute Entry), its post-trial Orders dated December 3,1991 and January 10,
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1992, and its Minute Entry dated July 22, 1992, and the Court having entered its written
Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law,
IT IS HEREBY ORDERED, ADJUDGED AND DECREED:
1.

Plaintiffs Petition to increase child support for the minor child is hereby

denied.
2.

The prior order of support established by the California Court requiring

Defendant to pay to Plaintiff $300.00 per month as child support will remain in full force
and effect.
3.

A substantial and material change of circumstances has occurred with the

Defendant's move to the State of Montana and the Plaintiffs loss of travel benefits from her
former employer, TWA Airlines. The prior custodial visitation order that Plaintiff pay all
transportation costs is hereby amended to require each of the parties to share equally, at
the best available rate, all of the costs of transportation for the child from Utah to
Defendant's residence until the minor child reaches the age of 18 and graduates from high
school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order of this
Court. Plaintiff is ordered to ask her husband (an airline employee) to secure discount
tickets for travel of the minor child to and from Defendant's visitation. If Plaintiff s husband
is willing to do so, Plaintiff shall then send a photocopy of the front page of the itinerary
part of the ticket indicating the amount paid, and Defendant is to reimburse Plaintiff for his
one-half of that amount one (1) week prior to the flight. If Defendant does not reimburse
4

Plaintiff for his one-half, at least one (1) week prior to the flight, then no visitation will
occur. Visitation will be agreed upon at least thirty (30) days prior to the scheduled
visitation and all parties will cooperate to effectuate these arrangements. If Plaintiffs
husband if unable to secure such discount tickets or is unwilling to do so, Plaintiff shall then
buy the tickets and send Defendant a photocopy for reimbursement under the conditions
set forth above. The parties are ordered to will cooperate in seeing that the Defendant has
all of the custodial visitation rights he was awarded under the California Decree of Divorce.
4.

Defendant be and he is hereby awarded judgment against Plaintiff for one-half

of those amounts incurred by the Defendant for transportation costs to accomplish his
visitation from November 21, 1988 through March 27, 1991 in the sum of $1,267.25.
5.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's private school tuition, interest, insurance, books, fees, uniforms
and school activities in the sum of $9,580.00 from November 21, 1988 through September
16, 1991.
6.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's additional private school activities, supplies and uniforms in
the sum of $2,900.69 from November 21, 1988 through September 16, 1991.
7.

Plaintiff be and she is hereby awarded a judgment against the Defendant for

his share of the minor child's medical, derital and prescription expenses in the sum of
$578.62 from November 21, 1988 through March 31, 1992.
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8.

The judgment awarded to Defendant above of $1,267.25 is to be applied

toward the three (3) judgments awarded to Plaintiff, totalling $13,05931, leaving a new
judgment in favor of Plaintiff and against Defendant in the sum of $11,792.06.
9.

Plaintiff and Defendant are hereby ordered to pay one-half of the minor

child's private school tuition, books, supplies, school activities and school uniforms from
September 16, 1991 until the child ceases to attend private school or until further order of
this Court.
10.

On the social security issue, the Court orders that the amounts paid to the

minor child, Michelle, as her benefits under the social security auxiliary benefits received
(due to Defendant's permanent disability) are the minor child's and the same are not to be
credited toward any amount of support for the minor child by Defendant or to cover her
private school costs.
11.

The parties are hereby ordered to share equally, from March 31, 1992, one-

half of the insurance deductibles and noncovered medical, dental and prescription expenses
for the minor child, Michelle, until she attains the age of eighteen (18) and has graduated
from high school during her normal and expected year of graduation or until further order
of this Court.
12.

The Defendant is not obligated to pay one-half of the minor child's

extracurricular activities.
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13.

The Court makes no ruling with regard to Plaintiffs risk to return Michelle's

benefits to social security if it is subsequently determined that the Defendant is not legally
disabled.
14.

The Court has taken into consideration the earning capability and the income

level of the Defendant in determining Defendant's obligations on behalf of the parties'
minor child. Defendant has the ability to pay the obligations imposed herein.
15.

Neither Plaintiff nor Defendant shall be awarded any attorneys' fee or costs

in this matter, and each shall assume and pay their own fees incurred.
16.

All remaining provisions of the California Order not amended, modified or

altered by this Order should remain in full force and effect.
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78-45-7.2. Application of guidelines — Rebuttal.
(1) The guidelines apply to any judicial or administrative order establishing or modifying an award of
child support entered on or after July 1, 1989.
(2) (a) The child support guidelines shall be applied as a rebuttable presumption in establishing
or modifying the amount of temporary or permanent child support.
(b) The rebuttable presumption means the provisions and considerations required by the guidelines and the award amounts resulting from the
application of the guidelines are presumed to be
correct, unless rebutted under the provisions of
this section.
(3) A written finding or specific finding on the
record supporting the conclusion that complying with
a provision of the guidelines or ordering an award
amount resulting from use of the guidelines would be
unjust, inappropriate, or not in the best interest of a
child in a particular case is sufficient to rebut the
presumption in that case.
(4) (a) Natural or adoptive children of either parent who live in the home of that parent and are
not children in common to both parties may at
the option of either party be taken into account
under the guidelines in setting or modifying a
child support award, as provided in Subsection
(5).
(b) Additional worksheets shall be prepared
that compute the obligations of the respective
parents for the additional children. The obligations shall then be subtracted from the appropriate parent's income before determining the
award in the instant case.
(5) In a proceeding to modify an existing award,
consideration of natural or adoptive children other
than those in common to both parties may be applied
to mitigate an increase in the award, but may not be
applied to justify a decrease in the award.
(6) With regard to child support orders, enactment
of the guidelines and any subsequent change in the
guidelines constitutes a substantial or material
change of circumstances as a ground for modification
of a court order, if there is a difference of at least 25%
between the existing order and the guidelines. With
regard to IV-D cases, the office may request modification, in accordance with the requirements of the Family Support Act of 1988, Public Law 100-485, no more
often than once every three years.
1990
78-45-7.3.

Procedure — Documentation — Stipulation.
(1) In a default or uncontested proceeding, the
moving party shall submit:
(a) a completed child support worksheet;
(b) the financial verification required by Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(c) a written statement indicating whether or
not the amount of child support requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(2) (a) If the documentation of income required under Subsection (1) is not available, a verified representation of the defaulting party's income by
the moving party, based on the best evidence
available, may be submitted.
(b) The evidence shall be in affidavit form and
may only be offered after a copy has been provided to the defaulting party in accordance with
Utah Rules of Civil Procedure or Title 63, Chapter 46b, the Administrative Procedures Act, in an
administrative proceeding.

78-45-7.5

(3) (a) In a stipulated proceeding, one of the moving parties shall submit:
(i) a completed child support worksheet;
(ii) the financial verification required by
Subsection 78-45-7.5(5); and
(iii) a written statement indicating
whether or not the amount of child support
requested is consistent with the guidelines.
(b) A hearing is not required, but the guidelines shall be used to review the adequacy of a
child support order negotiated by the parents.
(c) A stipulated amount for child support or
combined child support and alimony is adequate
under the guidelines if the stipulated child support amount or combined amount exceeds the
total child support award required by the guidelines. When the stipulated amount exceeds the
guidelines, it may be awarded without a finding
under Section 78-45-7.2.
1990
78-45-7.4.

Obligation — Adjusted gross income
used.
Adjusted gross income shall be used in calculating
each parent's share of the child support award. Only
income of the natural or adoptive parents of the child
may be used to determine the award under these
guidelines.
1989
78-45-7.5. Determination of gross income — Imputed income.
(1) As used in the guidelines "gross income" includes:
(a) prospective income from any source, including nonearned sources, except under Subsection (3); and
(b) income from salaries, wages, commissions,
royalties, bonuses, rents, gifts from anyone,
prizes, dividends, severance pay, pensions, interest, trust income, alimony from previous marriages, annuities, capital gains, social security
benefits, workers' compensation benefits, unemployment compensation, disability insurance
benefits, and payments from "nonmeans-tested"
government programs.
(2) Income from earned income sources is limited
to the equivalent of one full-time job.
(3) Specifically excluded from gross income are:
(a) Aid to Families with Dependent Children
(AFDC);
(b) benefits received under a housing subsidy
program, the Job Training Partnership Act,
S.S.I., Medicaid, Food Stamps, or General Assistance; and
(c) other similar means-tested welfare benefits
received by a parent.
(4) (a) Gross income from self-employment or operation of a business shall be calculated by
subtracting necessary expenses required for selfemployment or business operation from gross receipts. The income and expenses from self-employment or operation of a business shall be reviewed to determine an appropriate level of gross
income available to the parent to satisfy a child
support award. Only those expenses necessary to
allow the business to operate at a reasonable
level may be deducted from gross receipts.
(b) Gross income determined under this subsection may differ from the amount of business
income determined for tax purposes.
(5) (a) When possible, gross income should first be
computed on an annual basis and then recalcu-
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lated to determine the average gross monthly income.
(b) Each parent shall provide suitable documentation of current earnings, including year-todate pay stubs or employer statements. Each parent shall supplement documentation of current
earnings with copies of tax returns from at least
the most recent year to provide verification of
earnings over time and shall document income
from nonearned sources according to the source.
Verification of income from records maintained
by the Office of Employment Security may be
substituted for employer statements and income
tax returns.
(c) Historical and current earnings shall be
used to determine whether an underemployment
or overemployment situation exists.
(6) Gross income includes income imputed to the
parent under Subsection (7).
(7) (a) Income may not be imputed to a parent unless the parent stipulates to the amount imputed
or a hearing is held and a finding made that the
parent is voluntarily unemployed or underemployed.
(b) If income is imputed to a parent, the income shall be based upon employment potential
and probable earnings as derived from work history, occupation qualifications, and prevailing
earnings for persons of similar backgrounds in
the community.
(c) If a parent has no recent work history, income shall be imputed at least at the federal minimum wage for a 40-hour work week. To impute
a greater income, the judge in a judicial proceeding or the presiding officer in an administrative
proceeding shall enter specific findings of fact as
to the evidentiary basis for the imputation.
(d) Income may not be imputed if any of the
following conditions exist:
(i) the reasonable costs of child care for
the parents' minor children approach or
equal the amount of income the custodial
parent can earn;
(ii) a parent is physically or mentally disabled to the extent he cannot earn minimum
wage;
(iii) a parent is engaged in career or occupational training to establish basic job skills;
or
(iv) unusual emotional or physical needs
of a child require the custodial parent's presence in the home.
(8) (a) Gross income may not include the earnings
of a child who is the subject of a child support
award, nor benefits to a child in the child's own
right, such as Supplemental Security Income.
(b) Social Security benefits received by a child
due to the earnings of a parent may be credited
as child support to the parent upon whose earning record it is based, by crediting the amount
against the potential obligation of that parent.
Other unearned income of a child may be considered as income to a parent depending upon the
circumstances of each case.
1990
78-45-7.6. Adjusted gross income.
(1) As used in the guidelines, "adjusted gross income" is the amount calculated by subtracting from
gross income alimony previously ordered and paid
and child support previously ordered.
(2) The guidelines do not reduce the total child
support award by adjusting the gross incomes of the
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parents for alimony ordered in the pending proceeding. In establishing alimony, the court shall consider
that in determining the child support, the guidelines
do not provide a deduction from gross income for alimony.
1989
78-45-7.7. Calculation of obligations.
(1) The parents' child support obligation shall be
divided between them in proportion to their adjusted
gross incomes.
(2) Except in cases of joint physical custody and
split custody as defined in Section 78-45-2, the total
child support award shall be determined as follows:
(a) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table.
(b) Calculate each parent's proportionate
share of the base combined child support obligation by multiplying the combined child support
obligation by each parent's percentage of combined adjusted gross income, and subtracting
from the products the children's portion of any
monthly payments made directly by each parent
for medical and dental insurance premiums.
(c) Allocate monthly work-related child care
costs equally to each parent.
(d) Calculate the total child support award by
adding the noncustodial parent's share of the
base child support obligation calculated in Subsection (2Kb) and the amount allocated in Subsection (2)(c). Include in the order both amounts
and the total child support award.
(3) The base combined child support obligation table provides combined child support obligations for up
to ten children. For more than ten children, additional amounts shall be added to the base child support obligation shown. The amount shown on the table is the support amount for the total number of
children, not an amount per child.
1990
78-45-7.8.

Split custody — Obligation calculations.
In cases of split custody, the total child support
award shall be determined as follows:
(1) Combine the adjusted gross incomes of the
parents and determine the base combined child
support obligation using the base child support
obligation table. Allocate a portion of the calculated amount between the parents in proportion
to the number of children for whom each parent
has physical custody. The amounts so calculated
are a tentative base child support obligation due
each parent from the other parent for support of
the child or children for whom each parent has
physical custody.
(2) Multiply the tentative base child support
obligation due each parent by the percentage
that the other parent's adjusted gross income
bears to the total combined adjusted gross income
of both parents.
(3) Subtract from the products in Subsection
(2) the children's portion of any monthly payments made directly by each parent for medical
and dental insurance premiums.
(4) Subtract the lesser amount in Subsection
(3) from the larger amount to determine the base
child support award to be paid by the parent with
the greater financial obligation.
(5) Allocate combined monthly work-related
child care costs equally to each parent.
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